MAANPUOLUSTUSKURSSIYHDISTYS

How would Max see the world today?

 

Good afternoon, Mr President, honored guests, ladies and gentlemen.

 

I am genuinely delighted that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defence University decided to honor my late father, Max Jakobson, by organizing this seminar. My sincere thanks to both these organizations, and to Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja and Chairman Kari Jordan.

 

Anyone who knew Max would agree with me, I am sure, that Max would be very pleased in deed that this seminar is being held and specifically on this topic. The state of international relations was the focus of Max’s constant analysis, until the very end of his life. And after assessing the bigger picture, Max would always come back to the question closest to his heart – what does this mean for Finland? What does this event, this decision, this trend mean for Finland’s position in the world, for Finland’s continued independence, security and prosperity?

 

Generally speaking, the question of how small countries survive forms a thread throughout Max’s published work. Last summer, as I reread many of Max’s earlier publications, I was struck by how true still today some of the lessons that one can draw from his analysis are – despite the fact that we live in a more complex world and one in which political power has fragmented, as Max himself wrote about. Obviously, having myself spent the last 25 years analyzing international relations in Asia, and China in particular, my thinking is based on developments in that region. So as a prelude to today’s deliberations about Transatlantic relations I will inject a glimpse of Asia to our thinking. I will make two points.

 

Rereading Max’s first book The Diplomacy of the Winter War (Max Jakobson, The Diplomacy of the Winter War , Harvard University Press, 1961.) I was struck by how familiar some of his descriptions seemed of the contemplations taking place in European

capitals about evolving power politics. I could not help thinking how similar contemplations

are taking place in Asia today as China’s asserts itself as a major regional power. It was a

bit harrowing to read Max’s detailed description of how the outbreak of the Second World War was preceded by miscalculations by key leaders in Europe – starting with Hitler, Stalin, and Chamberlain – and by misunderstandings arising from different interpretations of what their foreign ministries had said to each other, and how constrained these leaders were by domestic politics in all of the relevant countries.

 

These same scenarios could repeat themselves in East Asia today, and of course greatly impact Transatlantic cooperation. Despite globalization and high levels of economic interdependency, despite improved modes of communication and increased people-to-people interactions, the governments of Barack Obama, Xi Jinping and Shinzo Abe are often mis-communicating with each other and misinterpreting emerging events much in the same way that leaders did in the years and months leading up to the Winter War and the Second World War – events which Max so vividly describes.

 

My second point is that despite the diffusion of power, despite all the talk of post-modernist states within international relations, the nation state is still very much the dominant factor defining peace and the stability of the world order. The rise of China has returned the nation state to the fore, so to speak, because China is very much a nation state, one that acts on the basis of respect for sovereignty and the right of a nation to safeguard sovereignty with force, if necessary.

 

In 1980 Max wrote... “As history is written by the victors, so is the agenda of world politics dictated by the powerful. ...The view of the world which underlies analyses of international relations reflects primarily the interests (and aspirations) of the great powers. Smaller nations are treated as objects of policy, ... as ours and theirs – pawns to be gained or lost in the conflicts or deals between the great powers.” (Max Jakobson, “Substance and Appearance: Finland”, Foreign Affairs , Summer 1980.)

 

Unfortunately, this assessment made by Max 33 years ago, to a large extent still holds true today when we think of the relations between the major powers in Asia. The stability of Asia will not hinge upon actions of small and middle-sized countries despite the numerous multilateral initiatives like ASEAN, but rather upon how China and Japan, and how China and the United States manage to sort out their relations. And small countries will continuously – as they have throughout centuries – be challenged to maintain their independence, to find a suitable role for themselves.

 

I conclude with an illuminating quote by Max about his own small country: “Ask Finns to explain their country and they are likely to begin by reminding you that Finland is, after all, a small nation – a phrase pregnant with hidden meaning. It is sometimes said with pride: Look how much we have achieved although we are a small nation. Or it may be said defensively: You cannot expect too much from us, we are only a small nation.

 

Sometimes, however, modesty is replaced by a smug tone of moral superiority, as if there were a special virtue attached to being a small nation – an assumption that once goaded Vyacheslav Molotov, Joseph Stalin’s foreign minister, to respond to a presentation by the Finnish ambassador with the remark: ‘The fact that Finland is a small nation doesn’t mean that you are always right’.” (Max Jakobson, Finland in the new Europe , Washington papers, Center for Strategic and International Studies CSIS, 1998, p. 4.)

 

I look forward to an inspiring seminar.

Thank you